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Abstract
The notion of a critical successor [dJV90] has been central to almost
all modal completeness proofs in interpretability logics. In this paper we
shall work with an alternative notion, that of an assuring successor. As we
shall see, this will enable more concisely formulated completeness proofs,
both with respect to ordinary and generalised Veltman semantics. Due to
their interesting theoretical properties, we will devote some space to the
study of a particular kind of assuring labels, the so-called full labels. After
a general treatment of assuringness, we shall apply it to obtain certain
completeness results. Namely, we give another proof of completeness of
ILW w.r.t. ordinary semantics and of ILP w.r.t. generalised semantics.
1 Introduction
This paper is about a technical aspect of interpretability logics. Interpretability
logics are propositional modal logics that naturally extend provability logic.
The provability logicGL is a propositional modal logic with a unary modal-
ity 2 that describes the notion of formal provability. Consequently, the dual
modality 3 refers to consistency. The logic GL comes with a natural Kripke
semantics where the truth conditions concerning the modalities are modeled
using a binary accessibility relation usually denoted by R.
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It is well-known that GL is complete with respect to its relational semantics
([Seg71]). The modal completeness proof is as usual performed by building a
sort of term model. That is to say, we build semantics out of syntax. Thus,
one considers maximal GL-consistent sets which will be worlds in the Kripke
model. The R relation between maximal consistent sets is defined in such a way
that the resulting structure yields a GL-model.
Provability logic describes, in precise sense, all the behavior about formal
provability of a theory that can be proven by that particular theory. In a similar
fashion, interpretability logics describe the provable behaviour of relativised
interpretability. Now, a binary modality  is used where the intended reading
of ϕψ is that some base theory T together with (the arithmetical reading of)
ϕ interprets T together with (the arithmetical reading of) ψ. By doing so, we
will see that 2ϕ is equivalent to ¬A  ⊥ so that interpretability logics indeed
naturally extend provability logic.
Whereas the logic of provability is very stable and the same for basically
any sound and strong enough theory, the situation with interpretability logics
differs a lot. Different theories have different interpretability logics which make
them interesting to study.
Interpretability logics also come with a Kripke-like semantics. Their models
are called Veltman models and they naturally extend models for provability.
The truth conditions for the binary modality  is now governed by a ternary
relation S between worlds in a Veltman model.
For various interpretability logics, we also know completeness w.r.t. the re-
spective class of Veltman models. Again, completeness proofs proceed by con-
structing a sort of term model.
From now on we will write MCS as short-hand for maximal consistent set
and confide that the context will reveal with respect to which logic we demand
consistency. For the current discussion we will actually not specify the respective
logics at all.
Since interpretability logics extend provability logic we will again have a
binary accessibility relation between MCS’s. However, it turns out to be much
more difficult to define the ternary accessibility relation S. The reason is that a
single MCS may be needed in various roles now (we shall see a concrete example
later in Figure 3).
The first completeness proofs for interpretability logics [dJV90] went about
this by labeling these roles inside the model. As such a single MCS could occur
multiple times in a model with different labels. The labels that were used in
the old days were used to flag so-called criticality.
Criticality flagged that a particular MCS had a particular functionality in
the Veltman model. This functionality however propagates to parts accessible
(either via R or S) from that particular MCS. As such, completeness proofs
could be very difficult and involved. Various different techniques were invented
to keep track of all the different roles.
Some times this could be done by keeping very close track of what roles
could come after what other roles ([dJV90], [GJ12]). In other occasions one had
to consider many roles at the same time so as to avoid uncontrolled interaction
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between them ([dJV99], [GJ08]).
In 2004, the first author of this paper invented a slight variation of critical
labels and called them assuring labels. This variation now allowed to consider
various roles at the same time. Where critical labels just keep track of a role
with respect to one particular formula, the assuring labels actually are sets of
formulas flagging that a MCS plays a role simultaneously with respect to all
formulas in the set.
As a first application of assuring labels a one-page completeness proof of
the logic ILW was given in [BGJ04]. This should be contrasted with the very
convoluted and complicated original completeness proof of around five pages
based on criticality [dJV99].
In years after the publication of [BGJ04], all new completeness proofs used
the assuring labels and in [MV20] a uniform treatment of completeness proofs
with respect to so-called generalised Veltman semantics could be given by mak-
ing essential use of assuring labels.
The current paper is an expansion of [BGJ04] which was written on the
occasion of Dick de Jongh’s 60th birthday. A major draw-back of that paper is
that it was actually written for Dick de Jongh and the paper assumed so much
knowledge of the fields that virtually only Dick de Jongh could read it. Since
the new technique has turned out to be so important, we decided to elaborate
the old paper, make it self-contained, develop more of the theory and prove new
results culminating in the current paper.
As such, Section 2 contains the needed technical preliminaries for the re-
mainder of the paper. Then, in Section 3 we motivate the main notion of this
paper: assuring labels.
In Section 4 we develop the general theory of assuring labels. Next, in Section
5 we shall see how assuring labels are good for imposing frame conditions on
collections of MCS’s. This will be useful in completeness proofs.
To illustrate the applicability, in Section 7 we give a short completeness and
decidability proof of the logic ILW and Section 6 serves as a preparation.
Finally, Section 8 analyses in a sense how iterations of labels may be needed
in various situations, for example when considering the logic ILWR. As an
illustration we prove completeness of ILP with respect to a class of generalised
Veltman frames where this iteration of labels is accounted for.
2 Preliminaries
The language of interpretability logics is given by
A ::= ⊥ | p |A→ A | 2A | AA,
where p ranges over a countable set of propositional variables. Other Boolean
connectives are defined as abbreviations as usual. We treat  as having higher
priority than →, but lower than other logical connectives. We do not include 3
in the language, rather we take 3A as an abbreviation for ¬2¬A.
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Definition 2.1. The interpretability logic IL is axiomatised by the following
axiom schemas.
(Taut) classical tautologies (in the new language);
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B);
(L) (A→ A)→ A;
(J1) (A→ B)→ AB;
(J2) (AB) ∧ (B  C)→ A C;
(J3) (A C) ∧ (B  C)→ A ∨B  C;
(J4) AB → (3A→ 3B);
(J5) 3AA.
The rules of inference are Modus Ponens and Necessitation: A/2A.
We will write A ≡ B to denote (A  B) ∧ (B  A). The following lemma
is easy and we will use it throughout the paper, often tacitly. Even though the
proof is well-known and easy, we choose to include it as a warm-up for later
reasoning so that we see the axioms at work.
Lemma 2.2. The following are provable in IL.
1. 2A→ 22A;
2. 2A ≡ ¬A⊥;
3. A ≡ A ∧ 2¬A;
4. 2C ∧ (AB) → AB ∧ C;
5. For any formula A we have 23A ≡ 2⊥.
Proof. Item 1 is actually known to hold in GL. We observe that in IL we can
give an alternative proof: since 3¬A  ¬A, by J4 we get 33¬A → 3¬A and
contraposition yields the required 2A→ 22A.
Item 2 has two directions. First we observe that 2A→ 2(¬A→ ⊥) so that
by (J1) we obtain ¬A⊥. For the other direction, we apply (J4) to ¬A⊥ to
obtain 3¬A→ 3⊥. Since 3⊥ is provably (actually in GL) equivalent to ⊥ we
obtain 3¬A→ ⊥ which is just ¬3¬A, that is, 2A.
Item 3 has just one non-trivial direction. To address this, we observe that
A  (A ∧ 2¬A) ∨ (A ∧ 3A) so that by (J3) and (J2) we are done once we
show (A ∧ 3A)  A ∧ 2¬A. By contraposing an instance of (L) we obtain
3A→ 3(A∧2¬A) so by Necessitation and (J1) we obtain 3A3(A∧2¬A).
Now (J5) yields 3(A∧2¬A)A∧2¬A so that (J2) gives 3AA∧2¬A. The
result follows since clearly A ∧3A3A.
Item 4 is easy since 2C → 2(B → B ∧C) so that B B ∧C. Finally, Item
5 follows easily from (L) since 23A→ 23⊤ which implies 2(2⊥ → ⊥) so that
2⊥. ⊣
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In this paper we shall consider extensions of IL with the following principles.
W := AB → AB ∧2¬A
M := AB → A ∧ 2C B ∧ 2C
P := AB → 2(AB)
M0 := AB → 3A ∧ 2C B ∧ 2C
R := AB → ¬(A  ¬C)B ∧2C
There are two basic and mutually related semantics for interpretability log-
ics. In both cases, the ternary relation S will be conceived as a collection of
parametrised binary relations. The first, and the most commonly used seman-
tics, is Veltman semantics (or ordinary Veltman semantics).
Definition 2.3. A Veltman frame F is a structure (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}),
where W is a non-empty set, R is a transitive and converse well-founded binary
relation on W and for all w ∈W we have:
a) Sw ⊆ R[w]2, where R[w] = {x ∈ W : wRx};
b) Sw is reflexive on R[w];
c) Sw is transitive;
d) Sw ⊇ R[w]2 ∩R, i.e. if wRuRv then uSwv.
A Veltman model is a quadruple M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},), where the
first three components form a Veltman frame. The forcing relation  is extended
as usual in Boolean cases, and w  AB holds if and only if for all u such that
wRu and u  A there exists v such that uSwv and v  B.
The other commonly used semantics is the generalised Veltman semantics
by R. Verbrugge [Ver93].
Definition 2.4. A generalised Veltman frame F is a structure (W,R, {Sw : w ∈
W}), where W is a non-empty set, R is a transitive and converse well-founded
binary relation on W and for all w ∈W we have:
a) Sw ⊆ R[w]× (P(R[w]) \ {∅});
b) Sw is quasi-reflexive: wRu implies uSw{u};
c) Sw is quasi-transitive: if uSwV and vSwZv for all v ∈ V , then uSw(
⋃
v∈V Zv);
d) if wRuRv, then uSw{v};
e) monotonicity: if uSwV and V ⊆ Z ⊆ R[w], then uSwZ.
A generalised Veltman model is a quadruple M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},),
where the first three components form a generalised Veltman frame. With this
semantics, w  A  B holds if and only if for all u such that wRu and u  A
there exists V such that uSwV and V  B. By V  B we mean v  B for all
v ∈ V .
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Uppercase Greek, like Γ and ∆, will denote maximal consistent sets (MCS’s).
It will be clear from the context with respect to what logic the consistency will
refer. Uppercase Roman denotes modal interpretability formulas A,B,C, . . . or
sets of such formulas S, T, U, . . .. An exception to this rule is that we might
write formulas from a set S as Si, Sj etc. in particular if S is a set of formulas
the
∨
Si denotes a finite disjunction over some formulas in S. If we talk of logics
we mean extensions of IL. As usual we use ⊡A as an abbreviation for A ∧2A.
If S is a set of formulas then we write 2S for {2A | A ∈ S}.
3 Extending criticality
As mentioned before, completeness proofs typically follow the following scheme.
We take a formula A that is not provable. Hence ¬A is included in some MCS Γ.
Next define the binary relation R on MCS’s together with the ternary relation
S so that the resulting structure is a model of the logic under consideration.
Finally, we prove a so-called Truth lemma that states
∀∆∀B
(
B ∈ ∆ ⇔ ∆  B
)
. (1)
Now, since ¬A ∈ Γ we get that A is falsified somewhere in our model.
It is easy to see that a least requirement for (1) to hold with respect to
formulas of the form 2C is that whenever ΓR∆ we have for any 2A ∈ Γ that
A,2A ∈ ∆. This consideration gives rise to defining the following relation
between MCS’s.
Definition 3.1. For MCS’s Γ and ∆ we define
Γ ≺ ∆ :⇔ ∀A
(
2A ∈ Γ⇒ A,2A ∈ ∆
)
.
We will now investigate what (1) imposes on the S relation. In particular.
let us consider the condition for a formula ¬(AB) to be true in some world x
in some particular model. From the previous section we know that x  ¬(AB)
if and only if there is some world y so that xRy, so that y  A but for no z for
which ySxz will we have z  B. In particular, since ySxy we see that y  ¬B.
Moreover, since yRu→ ySxu we also see that y  2¬A.
Thus, certain relations ΓR∆ actually should come with a promise that for
any ∆′ with ∆SΓ∆
′ we will have ¬B,2¬B ∈ ∆′. Of course, we should also
have ¬C,2¬C ∈ ∆′ for any C so that C  B. Let us introduce the notion of
criticality from [dJV90].
Definition 3.2. For MCS’s Γ and ∆ and for C a formula, we say that ∆ is a
C-critical successor of Γ whenever
∀B
(
B  C ∈ Γ ⇒ ¬B,2¬B ∈ ∆
)
.
We will write Γ ≺C ∆ in this case.1
1The usual notation for criticality is Γ ≺C ∆. We write Γ ≺
C ∆ for criticality in this paper
in order to more clearly distinguish it from assuringness, which we denote with Γ ≺S ∆.
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It is easy to see that C-criticality naturally extends the ≺ relation as reflected
by the following easy lemma.
Lemma 3.3. For MCS’s Γ and ∆ we have Γ ≺ ∆ ⇔ Γ ≺⊥ ∆.
Proof. Immediate since 2A ∈ Γ ⇔ ¬A⊥ ∈ Γ. ⊣
We can see C-criticality as a promise that the formula C will be avoided
in a strong sense. All completeness proofs before [BGJ04] made essential use
of critical successors. Whenever in a structure of MCS’s a Γ ≺C ∆ was there,
the definition of the SΓ relation should reflect the promise that C should be
avoided. This strategy, although successful, resulted in a need for complicated
book-keeping to keep all promises.
An improvement can be made if we can deal with various promises at the
same time. Suppose we wished to define Γ ≺B,C ∆ in such a way that it
promises that both B and C are avoided in ∆ in a strong sense. Requiring that
simultaneously both Γ ≺B ∆ and Γ ≺C ∆ is not sufficient since the promises
may interact. In particular
if AB ∨ C ∈ Γ we should also require that ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆.
It is this simple idea that adds a lot of power to the notion of criticality. However
there is one more subtlety to it. It turns out to be very fruitful to apply a change
of perspective. Instead of speaking of a promise to avoid certain formulas it
turns out to be a very fruitful perspective to rather speak of assuring certain
formulas. If we do so, it will turn out that the set of promises has certain nice
properties. In particular, it can be closed under logic consequence as proven in
Lemma 4.7. These considerations give rise to the following definition.
Definition 3.4 (Assuring successor). Let S be a set of formulas. We define
Γ≺S∆, and say that ∆ is an S-assuring successor of Γ, if for any finite S′ ⊆ S
we have A 
∨
Sj∈S′ ¬Sj ∈ Γ ⇒ ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆ and for some 2C ∈ ∆ we have
2C 6∈ Γ. We will call S a label for Γ and ∆ or simply a label.
In the following lemma we shall see that the notion of assuring successor on
sets of formulas naturally extends the regular successor relation as well as the
critical successor relation.
Lemma 3.5.
1. Γ≺∅∆⇔ Γ ≺ ∆;
2. ∆ is a B-critical successor of Γ ⇔ Γ≺{¬B}∆ ⇔ Γ ≺
B ∆.
Proof. For the first item, we observe that the empty conjunction is per definition
equivalent to ⊥. Thus, by Lemma 2.2.2 we have A  ⊥ ∈ Γ if and only if
2¬A ∈ Γ. Consequently,
∀A
(
A⊥ ∈ Γ ⇒ ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆
)
⇔ ∀A
(
2¬A ∈ Γ ⇒ ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆
)
.
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Since we work in classical logic, the right-hand side is easily seen to be equivalent
to ∀A
(
2A ∈ Γ ⇒ A,2A ∈ ∆
)
.
The ⇐ direction of the second item is easy and the other direction follows
from the first item of this lemma: if we take a finite subset of {¬B} this is
either the empty set, or {¬B} itself. Now, A  ¬¬B ∈ Γ ⇒ ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆
follows from the assumption that ∆ is a B-critical successor of Γ and A ⊥ ∈
Γ ⇒ ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆ follows from the first item since critical successors are in
particular successors. ⊣
4 The theory of assuring labels and of full labels
In this section we will expose a general theory of assuring successors. In the
next section we will show how assuring successors can be used to solve, in a
uniform way, certain problematic aspects of modal completeness proofs.
As the name suggests, assuring labels assure certain formulas to be present.
This is made explicit in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. The relation ≺S assures elements in Γ and ∆ although it is not
allowed to speak of consistency formulas.
1. Γ≺S∆⇒ S,2S ⊆ ∆;
2. Γ≺S∆⇒ 3S ⊆ Γ;
3. Γ≺S∆⇒ the label S does not contain any formula of the form 3A.
Proof. The first item is clear since for any σ ∈ S we have that ¬σ  ¬σ is a
theorem and whence in Γ. By the definition of Γ≺S∆ we get that σ,2σ ∈ ∆.
The second item follows from the first: since Γ is maximal, for any σ ∈
Σ, either 3σ ∈ Γ or 2¬σ ∈ Γ. However, the latter would imply ¬σ ∈ ∆
contradiction our first item.
For the last item we reason as follows. Suppose for a contradiction that there
is some 3A in S. Then, by the first item we have both 3A ∈ ∆ and 23A ∈ ∆.
However, over GL we have that 23A is equivalent to 2⊥. But 2⊥ ∈ ∆ clearly
contradicts 3A ∈ ∆. ⊣
A label S between Γ≺S∆ keeps track of the formulas that are promised to
be in Γ and ∆ in virtue of certain interpretability formulas in Γ. The larger the
label, the more promises it stores.
Often we can enlarge the label for free. To see how much we can add we
need to following definition.
Definition 4.2. For any set of formulas T and maximal consistent set ∆ we
define
∆2T = {2¬A | T
′ ⊆ T finite , A
∨
Ti∈T ′
¬Ti ∈ ∆},
∆⊡T = {2¬A,¬A | T
′ ⊆ T finite , A
∨
Ti∈T ′
¬Ti ∈ ∆}.
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Note that ∆2∅ = {2¬A | A  ⊥ ∈ ∆}. However, we want to think about
this set as {2C | 2C ∈ ∆}. Clearly the two sets, although not literally equal,
behave the same when used within labels. Furthermore, note that Γ ≺S ∆
holds precisely if Γ⊡S ⊆ ∆. The next lemma tells us how promises propagate
over composition of successors.
Lemma 4.3. For the relation ≺S we have the following observations.
1. S ⊆ T & Γ≺T∆⇒ Γ≺S∆;
2. Γ≺S∆ ≺ ∆′ ⇒ Γ≺S∆′.
Proof. The first item is obvious since any finite subset of S is also a finite
subset of T whenever S ⊆ T . For the second item we observe that Γ≺S∆
implies Γ⊡S ⊆ ∆ whence by ∆ ≺ ∆
′ and 2Γ⊡S ⊆ Γ
⊡
S we see that Γ
⊡
S ⊆ ∆
′. ⊣
Notation 4.4. Often we shall simply write
∨
¬Si to indicate some particular
finite disjunction without really specifying it. If in the same context we will need
another particular but otherwise unspecified big disjunction we will flag this by
using a different index. Thus
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
¬Sj stands for the disjunction of two
particular but unspecified finite disjunctions of negated formulas from some label
set S.
Often we will consider a finite collection of formulas Cj such that each Cj will
interpret some finite disjunction of negated formulas from the label S. For each
particular formula Cj we will denote the corresponding disjunction by
∨
¬Sjk
and thus write Cj 
∨
¬Sjk. Subsequently, we will denote the big disjunction
over all k and all corresponding ¬Skj by
∨
¬Skj so that
∨
Ck 
∨
¬Skj .
The following lemma gives us a way to extend labels.
Lemma 4.5. For any logic (i.e. extension of IL) we have Γ≺S∆⇒ Γ≺S∪Γ⊡
S
∆.
Proof. Suppose Γ≺S∆ and C
∨
¬Si∨
∨
Aj∨3Aj ∈ Γ for some finite collection
of formulas ¬Aj ,2¬Aj ∈ Γ⊡S . In particular, for each j we have Aj 
∨
¬Sjk
for some finite collection (depending on j) of formulas Sjk from the label S.
Then C 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
Aj ∈ Γ and thus C 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
¬Sjk ∈ Γ which implies
¬C,2¬C ∈ ∆ since we assumed Γ≺S∆. ⊣
This lemma tells us in a sense that when we have Γ≺S∆, then certain sen-
tences in Γ justify that we may extend the label S. Will likewise the occurrence
of sentences in ∆ allow us to extend the label S? The next lemma tells us
that this is not the case. In particular, if A 
∨
¬Si for some Si ∈ S′ ⊆fin S,
then by definition ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆. However, when for some arbitrary A we have
¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆, this does not allow us to extend our label S.
Lemma 4.6. There is a Γ≺S∆ with p,2p ∈ ∆ but ¬(Γ≺S∪{p}∆).
Proof. Consider the model consisting of three points x, y and z given in Figure
1. We take Γ to be the modal theory of x and ∆ to be the modal theory of
y. Since q ∈ ∆ and (q  ¬p) ∈ Γ, whatever we take for S with Γ≺S∆, we will
never have Γ≺S∪{p}∆. ⊣
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xy z
S
q, p, p ¬p
q  ¬p
Figure 1: Situation described in Lemma 4.6.
Thus, via the previous two lemmas we see that the S-assuringness between
two sets Γ≺S∆ can only be automatically extended via Γ. The next lemma tells
us that there are other ways to ‘freely extend’ a label.
Lemma 4.7. For any logic we have
1. (Γ≺S∆) & (S ⊢ ϕ) =⇒ Γ≺S∪{ϕ}∆;
2. Γ≺S∆ =⇒ Γ≺S∪2S∆;
Proof. For the first item—full labels are closed under logical consequence—we
assume that S ⊢ ϕ where the notion of logical consequence depends on the
logic in question. Thus for some S1, . . . , Sn ∈ S we have S1 ∧ . . . ∧ Sn ⊢ ϕ.
Consequently, ⊢ ¬ϕ→
∨
¬Sj and also ⊢ 2(¬ϕ→
∨
¬Sj). Thus, if Γ≺S∆ and
(A 
∨
¬Si ∨ ¬ϕ) ∈ Γ, also (A 
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ so that ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆ and we
conclude Γ≺S∪{ϕ}∆.
For the second item, we consider (A 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
¬2Sj) ∈ Γ. But since
¬2Sj ≡ 3¬Sj and 3¬Sj  ¬Sj we conclude (A 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
¬Sj) so that
¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆. ⊣
This Lemma 4.7 tells us that we can freely extend labels to be closed under
ILX consequences and to be closed under necessitation. Thus, we can identify
labels with ILX theories.
Moreover, Lemma 4.5 tells us that we can freely close off a label S for Γ≺S∆
under Γ⊡S . These observations lead us to the definition of Γ-full labels. When
the context makes clear which Γ is meant we shall simply speak of full labels.
Definition 4.8. For Γ a maximal consistent set we call S a Γ-full label whenever
S is an ILX-theory extending Γ⊡S .
In concrete, S is a Γ-full label whenever we have the following:
1. A
∨
¬Si ∈ Γ =⇒ ¬A,2¬A ∈ S;
2. in particular 2A ∈ Γ implies A ∈ S;
3. The label S is closed under logical consequence, that is, if S ⊢ ϕ, then
ϕ ∈ S;
4. the label S is closed under necessitation, that is, if B ∈ S, then 2B ∈ S.
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If we stick to full labels, there is a close correspondence between theories
and labels. We find this observation so essential that we formulate it explicitly
as a lemma:
Lemma 4.9. If Γ≺S∆ and S is full, then S is an ILX-theory.
We pose as open question whether for any consistent ILX-theory S we can
find MCS’s Γ and ∆ so that Γ≺S∆. In case this could be answered in the
affirmative it would be interesting to know whether the result can be extended
to arbitrary chains of increasing theories.
Full labels contain as many free promises as possible and posses certain nice
closure properties. In particular, we have the following lemma that justify the
name ‘full’.
Lemma 4.10. Given a MCS Γ and a label S, then S is Γ-full if and only if
∀T
(
S ⊆ T ∧ ∀∆
(
Γ≺S∆⇒ Γ≺T∆
)
=⇒ S = T
)
.
The S and T range here over ILX theories, and ∆ over MCS.
Proof. First assume that S is a Γ-full label and S ⊂ T . We want to show there
is a MCS ∆ with Γ≺S∆ but ¬(Γ≺T∆). As S ⊂ T , there is some φ ∈ T for
which we have φ /∈ S, and therefore, by S being Γ-full, φ /∈ Γ⊡S ⊆ S. Since S
is a theory also S 0 φ and Γ⊡S 0 φ. Then there exists a MCS ∆ containing Γ
⊡
S
with φ /∈ ∆. Clearly Γ≺S∆, and as ¬φ¬φ ∈ Γ, φ ∈ T and φ /∈ ∆, we see that
¬(Γ≺T∆).
For the other direction assume Γ⊡S 6⊆ S. We want to find a theory T ⊃ S
with ∀∆
(
Γ≺S∆ ⇒ Γ≺T∆
)
. Take T to be the theory generated by S ∪ Γ⊡S : it
certainly is bigger then S. Now assume Γ≺S∆, but then Γ≺S∪Γ⊡
S
∆ by Lemma
4.5. ⊣
Full labels can at times simplify matters. In particular, they clearly propa-
gate along successors as expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11. If Γ≺S∆≺TΛ, for some full labels S and T , then S ⊆ T .
Proof. For any Si ∈ S we have 2Si ∈ ∆ so, by fullness, Si ∈ T . ⊣
Thus, this Lemma states that full labels accrue information along the top
successor relation. Does information between related full labels also ‘reflect
down’? To put it otherwise, it may be natural to ask if Lemma 4.3.2 (Γ≺S∆ ≺
∆′ ⇒ Γ≺S∆′) can be strengthened. That is to say, suppose we have Γ≺S∆≺T∆′,
can we say something more than just Γ≺S∆′? As we shall see in the next sec-
tion, it turns out that for extensions of IL we often can. In general this does
not seem to hold, at least if we do not require our labels to be full. Suppose
Γ≺∅∆≺{p}∆
′ (see Figure 2). If p ¬p ∈ Γ and p ∈ ∆′, there is a MCS Λ with
¬p ∈ Λ. Clearly, the fact that we have {p} between ∆ and ∆′ did not stop
¬p ∈ Λ. Let us mention a question that we do not have a definite answer for.
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Figure 2: Downward influence
p, q, r
u1v1
p p, q, r
u2 v2
q
r  ¬p ∨ ¬q, ¬(r  ¬p), ¬(r  ¬q)
{p} {q}
w
Figure 3: Incomparable labels
Suppose Γ≺S∆≺T∆′ and S and T are full labels. Is there a (non-trivial) notion
of a “T -influenced formula” such that we may put the T -influenced formulas
between Γ and ∆′?
Although a label can be full, this does not mean we can always find a max-
imum among the possible labels. We shall now exhibit a model that generates
maximal consistent sets Γ and ∆ with two incomparable labels between them.
Thus, full labels need not necessarily be maximal.
Lemma 4.12. There are maximal consistent sets Γ and ∆ and labels S and T
with Γ≺S∆ and Γ≺T∆ so that ¬(Γ≺S∪T∆).
Proof. We let S := {p}, T := {q} and consider the model in Figure 3. Let Γ be
the modal theory of the world w and ∆ be the modal theory of the world u1.
Clearly, u1 and u2 have the same modal theory.
⊣
When Γ≺S∆, this enforces many formulas of the form ¬(AB) to be in Γ
as we can see in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.13. Let Γ≺S∆ with A ∈ ∆ and S′ ⊆fin S. We then have
¬(A
∨
Si∈S′
¬Si) ∈ Γ.
Proof. Suppose A 
∨
Si∈S′ ¬Si ∈ Γ. Then by Γ≺S∆ we would have ¬A ∈
∆ which is a contradiction. Thus A 
∨
Si∈S′ ¬Si /∈ Γ and by maximality
¬(A
∨
Si∈S′ ¬Si) ∈ Γ. ⊣
Conversely, the next lemma will show that given a label S and maximal
consistent set Γ we have: if there are sufficiently many negated interpretability
formulas related to S in Γ, then we can conclude that there exists some MCS
∆ with Γ≺S∆.
Theorem 4.14. Let Γ be a MCS and S a set of formulas. If for any choice of
Si ∈ S we have that ¬(B 
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ, then2 there exists a MCS ∆ such that
Γ≺S∆ ∋ B,2¬B.
2Lemma 4.13 tells us that we actually have iff.
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Proof. Suppose for a contradiction there is no such ∆. Then there is a formula3
A such that for some Si ∈ S, (A 
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ and B,2¬B,¬A,2¬A ⊢ ⊥.
Then ⊢ 2¬B ∧ B  A ∨ 3A and we get ⊢ B  A. As (A 
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ, also
(B 
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ. A contradiction. ⊣
Lemma 4.15. Let Γ be a MCS such that ¬(B C) ∈ Γ. Then there is a MCS
∆ such that Γ≺{¬C}∆ and B,2¬B ∈ ∆.
Proof. Taking S = {¬C} in Theorem 4.14. ⊣
Lemma 4.16. Let Γ and ∆ be MCS’s such that A  B ∈ Γ≺S∆ ∋ A. Then
there is a MCS ∆′ such that Γ≺S∆′ ∋ B,2¬B.
Proof. First we see that for any choice of Si, ¬(B 
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ. Suppose not.
Then for some Si, (B
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ because Γ is a MCS. But then (A
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ
and by Γ≺S∆ we have ¬A ∈ ∆. A contradiction. So ¬(B 
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ for any
choice of Si and we can apply Theorem 4.14. ⊣
5 Frame conditions and labeling lemmata
Although we do not yet prove completeness of any extension of IL in this section,
we recall what steps there are along the way when constructing a counter-
model to an unprovable formula. We can think of the step-by-step method of
constructing a counter-model used e.g. in [GJ08] for now. Later, in Section 7,
we give a proof of completeness and the finite model property for ILW and a
proof of completeness for ILP in Section 9, defining a model all at once.
The idea in all the cases is to build a model from MCS’s and define the
R and SΓ accessibility relations on them, where in particular the R relation
is to be defined using ≺. We wish to use the labels along ≺ to keep track of
the promises posed on later added worlds by already contained interpretability
formulas, and, as we shall see, also to be able to ensure we can satisfy the frame
conditions corresponding to the additional axiom schemes locally.
Let W be a multiset of MCS’s used in the model we wish to define. The
main points one has to address are the following three:
1. For each Γ ∈ W with ¬(A  B) ∈ Γ we need to include a {¬B}-assuring
successor ∆ in W for which A ∈ ∆.
2. For each Γ,∆ ∈ W with C D ∈ Γ ≺ ∆ ∋ C we need to include a ∆′ in
W for which Γ ≺ ∆′ ∋ D. Moreover if ∆ is a T -assuring successor of Γ
then we should be able to choose ∆′ a T -assuring successor of Γ as well
(to carry promises along the SΓ relation).
3. We need to make sure all the appropriate frame conditions are satisfied.
3There are finitely many Aj with for some S
j
i
, (Aj
∨
¬Sj
i
) ∈ Γ and 2¬B,B,¬Aj ,2¬Aj ⊢
⊥. We can take A to be
∨
j
Aj .
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Figure 4: Ensuring frame condition for P
Γ
∆
Ω
SΓ
S ∪∆
S ∪∆
Σ
Figure 5: Ensuring frame condition for M
The existence Lemmata 4.15, 4.16 of the previous section ensure existence
of MCS’s required to witness modal formulas as specified in Item 1 and Item 2.
When working in IL alone, making sure that the frame conditions are satisfied
does not pose any problems [dJJ98], as they are just the basic properties of R
and SΓ, but with various extensions of IL the situation regarding the frame
conditions for the additional modal principles becomes more complicated (cf.
[dJV90, GJ04]).
Principle P. Let us see how frame conditions locally impose requirements
on MCS’s, taking ILP as the first example. The frame condition for P is the
following [dJV90]:
wRw′RuSwv ⇒ uSw′v
The frame condition for P imposes on MCS’s the following:
Γ ≺ Λ ≺ ∆SΓΣ⇒ ∆SΛΣ.
When MCS Σ ∋ D is to be chosen to witness a formula CD ∈ Γ ≺ ∆ ∋ C
by Item 2, we want to be able to do so in a way where not only Γ ≺ Σ (and the
same formulas are assured), but also Λ ≺ Σ. Moreover, if Λ ≺T ∆, it should
be possible to choose Σ so that Λ ≺T Σ. Only then it is consistent to draw the
∆SΛΣ arrow required by the frame condition, as depicted in Figure 4.
To see such requirements are indeed possible to meet, we will prove, for each
principle, a labeling lemma. Labeling lemmata tell us how to label the ≺ relation
in a sufficient way to ensure we can meet the requirements imposed by frame
conditions locally.
Lemma 5.1. For logics containing P we have Γ≺SΛ≺T∆⇒ Γ≺S∪Λ⊡
T
∆.
Proof. Suppose C 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
Aj ∨ 3Aj ∈ Γ, where 2¬Aj ,¬Aj ∈ Λ⊡T . Then
C 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
Aj ∈ Γ and thus by P we obtain C 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
Aj ∈ Λ. Since
Γ≺SΛ we have 2
∧
Si ∈ Λ so we obtain C 
∨
Aj ∈ Λ. But for each Aj we
have Aj 
∨
¬Tjk ∈ Λ and thus C 
∨
¬Tjk ∈ Λ. Since Λ ≺T ∆ we conclude
¬C,2¬C ∈ ∆. ⊣
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In the case of P, a simpler labeling lemma can be used to ensure the frame
condition locally, provided we consider the labels that are full (S a Γ-full label,
and T a Λ-full label).
Lemma 5.2. For logics containing P we have
Γ≺SΛ≺T∆⇒ Γ≺T∆
Proof. Assume Γ≺SΛ≺T∆, and C
∨
¬Ti ∈ Γ. Then by P we know C
∨
¬Ti ∈
Λ. Since Λ ≺T ∆ we conclude ¬C,2¬C ∈ ∆. ⊣
Note that the lemma is true in the case of ordinary labels, but in that case,
the previous lemma gives us more precise labeling information to ensure the
frame condition locally. This is because only for full labels we in fact have
S ∪ Λ⊡T ⊆ T .
Principle M. The frame condition for M is the following [dJV90]:
uSwvRz ⇒ uRz.
The frame condition for M imposes on MCS the following:
∆SΓΣ ≺ Ω⇒ ∆ ≺ Ω.
When MCS Σ ∋ D is chosen to witness a formula C D ∈ Γ ≺ ∆ ∋ C by
Item 2, we want to do so in such a way that whenever we later need to add a
MCS Ω with Σ ≺ Ω, we can also draw the ∆ ≺ Ω arrow. Therefore we need to
ensure ∆2∅ along the Γ ≺ Σ arrow (as we remarked previously, one can think of
the set ∆2∅ as simply {2C | 2C ∈ ∆}), we achieve this by ensuring ∆
2
∅ along
the Γ ≺ ∆ arrow. The situation is depicted in Figure 5. The corresponding
labeling lemma is the following:
Lemma 5.3. For logics containing M we have Γ≺S∆⇒ Γ≺S∪∆2
∅
∆.
Proof. Assume that for some 2Cj ∈ ∆
2
∅ we have (A 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
¬2Cj) ∈ Γ.
By M, (A∧
∧
2Cj 
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ, whence ⊡¬(A∧
∧
2Cj) ∈ ∆. As
∧
2Cj ∈ ∆,
we conclude ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆. ⊣
In the case of M, we have no simpler labeling lemma in case S is a Γ-full
label.
Principle M0. The frame condition for M0 is the following [GJ08]:
wRuRxSwvRz ⇒ uRz
The frame condition for M0 imposes on MCS the following:
Γ ≺ ∆ ≺ ∆′SΓΣ ≺ Ω⇒ ∆ ≺ Ω.
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Figure 6: Ensuring frame condition for M0
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Figure 7: Ensuring frame condition for R
When MCS Σ ∋ D is chosen to witness a formula C D ∈ Γ ≺ ∆ ≺ ∆′ ∋ C
by Item 2, we want to do so in such a way that whenever we later need to add
a MCS Ω with Σ ≺ Ω, we can also draw the ∆ ≺ Ω arrow. Therefore we again
need to ensure ∆2∅ along the Γ ≺ Σ arrow. The situation is depicted in Figure
6, and the corresponding labeling lemma is the following (as before, we do not
have a special lemma in case the labels are full):
Lemma 5.4. For logics containing M0 we have Γ≺S∆ ≺ ∆′ ⇒ Γ≺S∪∆2
∅
∆′.
Proof. Suppose C 
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
3Aj ∈ Γ, where 2¬Aj ∈ ∆2∅ . By M0 we obtain
3C ∧
∧
2¬Aj 
∨
¬Si ∈ Γ. So, since Γ≺S∆ and
∧
2¬Aj ∈ ∆ we obtain
2¬C ∈ ∆ and thus 2¬C,¬C ∈ ∆′. ⊣
Principle R. Last we will look at a more complicated case of ILR.
The frame condition for the principle R is the following [GJ11].4
wRxRySwy
′Rz ⇒ ySxz.
On MCS, the condition imposes the following:
Γ ≺ Λ ≺ ∆SΓΣ ≺ Ω⇒ ∆SΛΩ.
The frame condition is depicted in Figure 7. Assume Σ ∋ D was chosen as
a witness for C D ∈ ΓR∆ ∋ C. Since ∆ lies T -assuring above Λ, we should
not only make sure that Σ lies S-assuring above Γ, but also that any successor
Ω of Σ lies T -assuring above Λ. Only then we would be justified to draw the
required ∆SΛΩ arrow. One way to guarantee Λ≺TΩ is to ensure Λ2T along the
Γ ≺ Σ arrow: whenever B 
∨
¬Ti ∈ Λ, we have 2¬B ∈ Λ2T and this puts
2¬B ∈ Σ and 2¬B,¬B ∈ Ω as required.
The corresponding labeling lemma is the following:
4 In [GJ04] the modal principle A  B → ¬(A  ¬C) ∧ (D  C)  B ∧ 2C was called R.
This principle and the one called R in this paper are easily seen to be equivalent over IL.
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Lemma 5.5. For logics containing R we have Γ≺SΛ≺T∆⇒ Γ≺S∪Λ2
T
∆.
Proof. We consider A such that for some Si ∈ S and some 2¬Aj ∈ Λ2T , we have
(A
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
3Aj) ∈ Γ. By R we obtain (¬(A
∨
Aj)
∨
¬Si) ∈ Γ, thus by
Γ≺SΛ we get (A 
∨
Aj) ∈ Λ. As (Aj 
∨
¬Tkj) ∈ Λ, also (A 
∨
¬Tkj) ∈ Λ.
By Λ≺T∆ we conclude ⊡¬A ∈ ∆. ⊣
In the case of R, a simpler labeling lemma can be used to ensure the frame
condition locally if T is Λ-full:
Lemma 5.6. For logics containing R we have Γ≺SΛ≺T∆⇒ Γ≺S∪2T∆
Proof. Assume A
∨
¬Si∨
∨
¬2Tj ∈ Γ. Then, by R, we obtain ¬(A
∨
¬Tj)∨
¬Si ∈ Γ and by Γ≺SΛ we know ⊡(A 
∨
¬Tj) ∈ Λ, and ⊡¬A ∈ Σ as
required. ⊣
As before in the case of logics containing P and Lemma 5.2, this lemma
ensures the frame condition locally provided the labels are full: for in this case
Λ⊡T ⊆ T and therefore, because T is a theory, Λ
2
T ⊆ 2T , and consequently
S ∪Λ2T ⊆ S ∪2T . Thus sufficient information is carried by the composed label.
Case of ILW. Let us state two existence lemmata for ILW, a logic without
a first order frame property.
Lemma 5.7. Suppose ¬(AB) ∈ Γ. There exists some ∆ with Γ ≺{2¬A,¬B} ∆
and A ∈ ∆.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there is no such ∆. Then there is a
formula E with (E 3A ∨B) ∈ Γ such that A,¬E,2¬E ⊢ ⊥ and so ⊢ AE.
Then (A  3A ∨ B) ∈ Γ and by the principle W we have A  B ∈ Γ. The
contradiction. ⊣
Lemma 5.8. For logics containing W we have that if BC ∈ Γ≺S∆ ∋ B then
there exists ∆ with Γ≺S∪{2¬B}∆ ∋ C,2¬C.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that no such ∆ exists. Then for some formula
A with (A
∨
¬Si ∨3B) ∈ Γ, we get C,2¬C,¬A,2¬A ⊢ ⊥, whence ⊢ C A.
Thus B  C  A 
∨
¬Si ∨ 3B ∈ Γ. By W, B 
∨
¬Si ∈ Γ which contradicts
Γ≺S∆ ∋ B. ⊣
6 Going finite
Proving the decidability of an interpretability logic is in all known cases done
by either proving completeness with respect to finite models ([dJV90], [dJV99])
or by showing that the logic has the finite model property ([PV16], [MPV17]).
The finite model property is easier to achieve if the building blocks of the model
are finite sets instead of infinite maximal consistent sets.
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In completeness proofs, a turn that is usually made to obtain finite building
blocks is to work with truncated parts of maximal consistent sets. These trun-
cated parts should be large enough to allow for the basic reasoning, and this
gives rise to the notion of so-called adequate sets. Note that different logics yield
different notions of adequacy. In order to obtain the finite model property along
with modal completeness of ILW, in the next section we will use the following
notion of adequacy.
Definition 6.1 (Adequate set). We say that a set of formulas Φ is adequate iff
1. ⊥⊥ ∈ Φ;
2. Φ is closed under single negation and subformulas;
3. If both A is an antecedent or consequent of some  formula in Φ and so
is B then AB ∈ Φ.
It is clear that any formula is contained in some finite and minimal adequate
set. For a formula F we will denote this set by Φ(F ). Here and in the following
section MCS’s are subsets of, and maximal w.r.t., some adequate set Φ. Since
our maximal consistent sets are more restricted we should also modify the notion
of an assuring successor a bit.
Definition 6.2 (〈S,Φ〉-assuring successor). Let Φ be a finite adequate set,
S ⊆ Φ and Γ,∆ ⊆ Φ be maximal consistent sets. We say that ∆ is an 〈S,Φ〉-
assuring successor of Γ (Γ ≺ΦS ∆) iff for each 2¬A ∈ Φ we have
Γ ⊢ A
∨
Si∈S
¬Si ⇒ ¬A,2¬A ∈ ∆,
and if moreover for some 2C ∈ ∆ we have 2C 6∈ Γ.
Note that by the requirement 2¬A ∈ Φ the usual reading of ≺ in extensions
of GL coincides with ≺Φ∅ . So we will write ≺ for ≺
Φ
∅ . The following two lemmas
follow from their infinite counterparts, by taking intersections between the sets
given by those lemmas, and the set Φ.
Lemma 6.3. Let Γ ⊆ Φ be maximal consistent. If ¬(A  B) ∈ Γ then there
exists some maximal consistent set ∆ ⊆ Φ such that A ∈ ∆ and Γ ≺Φ{¬B,2¬A} ∆.
Proof. Since Γ is consistent, there is an extension Γ′ ⊇ Γ that is maximal
consistent w.r.t. the set of all modal formulas (not just Φ). By Lemma 5.7,
there is a set ∆′ with Γ′ ≺{2¬A,¬B} ∆
′ ∋ A, and ∆′ is maximal consistent w.r.t.
the set of all modal formulas. The set ∆ = ∆′ ∩ Φ is the required MCS. ⊣
Lemma 6.4. Let Γ,∆ ⊆ Φ be maximal consistent and S ⊆ Φ. If A  B ∈ Γ,
Γ ≺ΦS ∆ and A ∈ ∆ then there exists some maximal consistent ∆
′ ⊆ Φ with
B ∈ ∆′ and Γ ≺Φ
S∪{2¬A} ∆
′.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 6.3, but this time employing Lemma
5.8. ⊣
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7 The logic ILW
As a demonstration of the use of assuringness we will give in this section a
relatively simple proof of the known fact that ILW is a complete logic.
In what follows we let Φ be some fixed finite adequate set and reason with
ILW (e.g. ⊢ is ILW-provable, and consistent is ILW-consistent). The rest of
this section is devoted to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1 (Completeness of ILW [dJV99]). ILW is complete with respect to
finite Veltman frames 〈W,R, S〉 in which, for each w ∈W , (Sw;R) is conversely
well-founded (c.w.f.).
Suppose 6⊢ G. Let Φ = Φ(¬G) and let Γ ⊆ Φ be a maximal consistent set
that contains ¬G. We will construct a Veltman model 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉
in which for each w ∈ W we have that (Sw;R) is conversely well-founded. Each
w ∈ W will be a tuple the second component of which—denoted by (w)1—will
be a maximal consistent subset of Φ. For some w ∈ W we will have (w)1 = Γ
and we will finish the proof by proving a truth lemma: w  A iff A ∈ (w)1.
Let the height of a maximal consistent ∆ ⊆ Φ be defined as the number of
2-formulas in ∆ minus the number of 2-formulas in Γ. For sequences σ0 and
σ1 we write σ0 ⊆ σ1 iff σ0 is an initial, but not necessarily proper subsequence
of σ1. For two sequences σ0 and σ1, σ0 ∗ σ1 denotes the concatenation of the
two sequences. If S is a set of formulas then 〈S〉 is the sequence of length one
and only element S. Let us now define 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉.
1. W is the set of pairs 〈σ,∆〉 where ∆ ⊆ Φ is maximal consistent such that
either Γ = ∆ or Γ ≺ ∆ and σ is a finite sequence of subsets of Φ the length
of which does not exceed the height of ∆. For w = 〈σ,∆〉 we write (w)0
for σ and (w)1 for ∆.
2. wRv iff for some S we have (v)0 ⊇ (w)0 ∗ 〈S〉 and (w)1 ≺ΦS (v)1.
3. xSwy iff wRx, y and, xRy or x = y or both 3a and 3b hold:
(a) If (x)0 = (w)0 ∗ 〈S〉 ∗ τx and (y)0 = (w)0 ∗ 〈T 〉 ∗ τy, then S ⊆ T .
(b) For some C D ∈ (w)1 we have 2¬C ∈ T and, C ∈ (x)1 or 3C ∈
(x)1.
4. V (p) = {w ∈ W | p ∈ (w)1}.
We shall now see that this defines an ILW-model. First we see that R
behaves properly.
Lemma 7.2. R is transitive and conversely well-founded.
Proof. Transitivity follows from the fact that (x)1 ≺ΦS (y)1 ≺ (z)1 implies
(x)1 ≺ΦS (z)1. Converse well-foundedness now follows from the fact that our
model is finite and R is irreflexive. ⊣
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Next we show that the Sw-relations comply with their requirements.
Lemma 7.3. wRxRy implies xSwy. Also wRx implies xSwx. Finally, Sw is
transitive.
Proof. The first two assertions hold by definition. So suppose xSwySwz. Let us
fix (x)0 ⊇ (w)0 ∗ 〈S〉, (y)0 ⊇ (w)0 ∗ 〈T 〉 and (z)0 ⊇ (w)0 ∗ 〈U〉. We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1: xRy or x = y. If x = y then we are done so we assume xRy. If yRz
or y = z then we are also easily done. So, we assume that for some CD ∈ (w)1
we have 2¬C ∈ U and, C ∈ (y)1 or 3C ∈ (y)1. Since (x)1 ≺ (y)1 we have that
3C ∈ (x)1 and thus we conclude xSwz.
Case 2: ¬xRy and x 6= y. In this case there exists some C D ∈ (w)1 with
2¬C ∈ T and C ∈ (x)1 or 3C ∈ (x)1. Whatever the reason for ySwz is, we
always have T ⊆ U and thus 2¬C ∈ U . So we conclude xSwz.
⊣
Finally, we check the frame condition for W.
Lemma 7.4. (Sw;R) is conversely well-founded.
Proof. Suppose we have an infinite sequence
x0Swy0Rx1Swy1R · · · .
For each i ≥ 0, fixXi and Yi such that (xi)0 ⊇ (w)0∗〈Xi〉 and (yi)0 ⊇ (w)0∗〈Yi〉.
We may assume that, for each i, xi 6= yi and ¬xiRyi. Fix i. Let Ci  Di be
the formula as given by Condition 3b. We thus have Ci  Di ∈ (w)1, where
2¬Ci ∈ Yi and, Ci ∈ (xi)1 or 3Ci ∈ (xi)1. For any j > i, this implies
2¬Ci ∈ Xj which gives 2¬Ci ∈ (xj)1 and thus ¬Ci,2¬Ci ∈ (yj)1. The latter
gives Ci 6= Cj , which is a contradiction since Φ is finite. ⊣
We conclude the proof of Theorem 7.1 by proving a truth lemma.
Lemma 7.5 (Truth lemma). For all F ∈ Φ and w ∈ W we have F ∈ (w)1 iff
w  F .
Proof. We proceed by induction on F .
The cases of the propositional variables and the connectives are easily prov-
able using properties of MCS’s and the  relation. So suppose F = AB.
(⇒) Suppose we have AB ∈ (w)1. Then for all v such that wRv and v  A
we have to find a u such that vSwu  B which, by the induction hypothesis,
is equivalent to B ∈ (u)1. Consider such a v. We have for some S that (v)0 =
(w)0 ∗ 〈S〉 ∗ τ and (w)1 ≺
Φ
S (v)1. By the induction hypothesis we see that
A ∈ (v)1, so by Lemma 6.4 there is a MCS ∆ such that (w)1 ≺ΦS∪{2¬A} ∆ ∋ B.
We take u = 〈(w)0 ∗ 〈S ∪ {2¬A}〉,∆〉. Now 3b holds whence vSwu.
(⇐) Suppose that A  B /∈ (w)1. Then ¬(A  B) ∈ (w)1 whence by
Lemma 6.3 there is a MCS ∆ such that (w)1 ≺Φ{2¬A,¬B} ∆ ∋ A. Consider
v′ = 〈(w)0 ∗ 〈{2¬A,¬B}〉,∆〉. We claim there is no u′ such that v′Swu′  B.
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TU ∪ Γ2S ∪∆
2
T
U ∪ Γ2S
U
S
∆
Γ
∆
Γ
U
S
T
S ∪∆2T
U ∪ Γ2S∪∆2
T
Figure 8: Two ways for computing the transitive closure in ILR.
Suppose otherwise. If v′Swu
′ because of v′Ru′ or v′ = u′, then (w)1 ≺Φ{¬B} (u
′)1
(possibly using the fact that (w)1 ≺Φ{¬B} (v
′)1 ≺Φ (u′)1 implies (w)1 ≺Φ{¬B}
(u′)1). Otherwise, both (3a) and (3b) hold. Then (u
′)0 = (w)0 ∗〈T 〉∗τ for some
T ⊇ {2¬A,¬B}. Thus (w)1 ≺Φ{¬B} (u
′)1. ⊣
8 Labels and transitive closure
The labelling that was considered in this paper so far was concerned with two or
three worlds at a time. Due to the transitivity of R, labelling longer sequences
often simplifies to labelling pairs or triples of worlds.
In this section, we show that labelling sequences in ILR-models indeed re-
duces to labelling triples of worlds. The completeness of the logic ILR w.r.t. the
ordinary Veltman semantics is still an open problem. The fact that labels for
this logic are compatible with transitive closures makes our labelling a good can-
didate for the step-by-step completeness proofs such as the construction method
[GJ08].
In the next section we deal with logics whose labelling does not trivially
reduce to labelling pairs or triples of worlds. At the moment, the only logics
falling into this category that we know of are various extensions of ILW. An
example is ILWR, which may also be the most interesting example since it is
the simplest logic among those whose (in)completeness status is currently open.
There is an easily identifiable problem in taking transitive closures when
working with assuringness. Suppose we are working in ILR. Let us recall the
labelling lemma for ILR, Lemma 5.5: Γ≺S∆≺T∆′ ⇒ Γ≺S∪∆2
T
∆′.
Consider the two pictures in Figure 8. If we compute the label between
the lower world and the upper world it does make a difference whether we first
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w x u
v z
S T
S ∪ x2
T ∪ {2¬C}
w x
T
C
Figure 9: Labels with ILWR
compute the label between the lower world and ∆ (left picture) or the label
between Γ and the upper world (right picture). We will show in Lemma 8.1
below that in the situation as given in Figure 8 we have
U ∪ Γ2S∪∆2
T
⊆ U ∪ Γ2S ∪∆
2
T .
And we should thus opt for the strategy as depicted in the leftmost picture when
computing the transitive closure of R.
Lemma 8.1. For logics containing R we have Γ≺S∆⇒ Γ2S∪∆2
T
⊆ ∆2T .
Proof. Consider 2¬A ∈ Γ2S∪∆2
T
, that is, for some Si ∈ S and 2¬Bj ∈ ∆
2
T ,
A
∨
¬Si ∨
∨
¬2¬Bj ∈ Γ. By R, ¬(A
∨
Bj)
∨
¬Si ∈ Γ, whence by Γ≺S∆,
we get A
∨
Bj ∈ ∆. But for each Bj there is Tjk ∈ T with Bj 
∨
¬Tjk ∈ ∆,
whence A
∨
¬Tjk ∈ ∆ and 2¬A ∈ ∆2T . ⊣
9 Non-trivial labellings of sequences
We will start this section with a presentation of an issue concerning labelling
in ILWR. We will then proceed to work with ILP, another logic exhibiting the
same issue (if we wish to prove a slightly stronger completeness result than the
standard one). We switch from ILWR to ILP because we do not have a full
proof of completeness of ILWR, while with ILP we can give a full completeness
proof together with a to-the-point presentation on how to deal with logics with
non-trivial labelling of sequences.
Recently, tools from an earlier version [BGJ04] of this paper have been used
as one of the key ingredients in the completeness proof of ILR and other log-
ics w.r.t. generalised semantics [MV20]. A natural next step is to tackle the
completeness of ILWR. However, when one tries to combine the completeness
proofs for ILW and ILR, a problem occurs. Let us first discuss this problem,
and then see how a more elaborate labelling system can help. At the moment
we do not know if the labelling systems will lead to a completeness proof of
ILWR. However the panorama looks promising. The problem that arises when
addressing ILWR also occurs in a completeness proof for ILP and there we
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can solve it. Thus, the above mentioned elaborate labelling systems should at
least be an ingredient, if not the whole solution, in proving the more interesting
completeness results.
Suppose5 we are building a model step-by-step (as in the construction method
[GJ08]) and we have AB ∈ w ≺S x ≺T u ∋ A. So, we need to find some v with
B ∈ v and a sufficiently strong label for wRv; and then declare uSwv. Using
the labelling lemmas for W and R, it is easy to find v with w ≺S∪x2
T
∪{2¬C} v
for some C contained either in u or in a world R-accessible from u. Let us for
the moment suppose that any such v fits our purposes.
Now, assume that at some later point during the construction, a world z
appears with vRz. By the frame condition of the principle R, we should have
uSxz. If we were building an ILR-model (and not an ILWR-model), we would
have to ensure just that z has the same assuringness as u with respect to x, that
is, xRz should be labelled with T . Since we are building an ILWR-model and
in order to ensure the frame condition for W, in addition to that we are to find
a formula C′ with x ≺T∪{2¬C′} z. An obvious candidate for C
′ is C. However,
from w ≺S∪x2
T
∪{2¬C} v ≺ z we only get x ≺T z (Lemma 22, [MV20]), and what
we would like is to have x ≺T∪{2¬C} z. Let us refer to this phenomenon as the
problem of label iteration.
One way to solve this problem is to simply require 2¬C to appear at the
right place in the original label, i.e., instead of asking for w ≺S∪x2
T
∪{2¬C} v, we
ask for
w ≺S∪x2
T∪{2¬C}
∪{2¬C} v. (2)
If we are proving completeness w.r.t. generalised semantics using the approach
from [MV20], this means that we should add a new condition in the definition
of Sw (Definition 28, [MV20]). However, similar to how the original condition
concerning two worlds requires us to add the new condition concerning three
worlds that we just described, this condition itself requires us to add another
condition, this time concerning four worlds. Let us illustrate this.
Suppose we have the following situation (see Figure 9):
AB ∈ w ≺S x ≺T u ∋ A and v ≺ z.
We would like to show uSxz. In particular, we have to show that if x ≺S u′ ≺T u,
then there is v with x ≺S∪{2¬A}∪u′2
T∪{2¬A}
v ∋ B. A good choice for such a
world v should satisfy
w ≺x2
S∪{2¬A}∪u′2
T∪{2¬A}
∪{2¬A} v, (3)
since from this we can conclude x ≺S∪{2¬A}∪u′2
T∪{2¬A}
v ∋ B. However, to be
able to conclude (3) we need to have a new case in the definition of Sw, one
that concerns not just u or just x and u, but x, u and u′. Analogous reasoning
applies for longer sequences of worlds.
5This paragraph describes the situation represented in Figure 9.
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It turns out the problem of label iteration, that, as we just saw, occurs with
ILWR, also occurs when trying to prove that ILP is complete w.r.t. the class of
generalised ILP-frames where an additional requirement which ensures (W)gen
is present.6 In the remainder of this section we will give a detailed exposition
on how to handle this problem in the case of ILP. The same general approach
should be useful for any other extension of ILW that exhibits the problem of
label iteration.
We will now introduce the labelling system for ILP and prove the com-
pleteness of ILP w.r.t. the class of generalised ILP-frames where an additional
requirement which ensures (W)gen is present.
(P)gen:
wRw′RuSwV ⇒ (∃V
′ ⊆ V ) uSw′V
′.
Recall the labelling lemma for ILP (Lemma 5.5.1):
w ≺S x ≺T u⇒ w ≺S∪x⊡
T
u.
The actual labelling that we use is an iterated generalisation of this property.
Thus, instead of defining labels between pairs of MCS’s, we consider tuples of
MCS’s with labels between them: wn ≺Sn wn−1 ≺Sn−1 · · · ≺S1 w0. We wish to
define labels for ILP similar to the ones for ILWR between w and v in (2) and
(3). We will first define these labels, and then prove the appropriate labelling
lemma.
Definition 9.1. For n ∈ ω\{0}, let (wi)i∈{0,...,n} be a finite sequence of ILP-
MCS’s, let (Si)i∈{1,...,n} be a finite sequence of sets of formulas and B be a
formula. We will define a sequence of sets of formulas, and we will denote this
sequence as
(Q((wi)i∈{0,...,n}, (Si)i∈{1,...,n}, B, j))j∈{1,...,n}.
Usually the MCS’s (wi)i∈{0,...,n} and the sets of formulas (Si)i∈{1,...,n} will be
clear from the context, so we will writeQj(B) forQ((wi)i∈{0,...,n}, (Si)i∈{1,...,n}, B, j).
We now recursively define the elements of our sequence:
Q1(B) := S1 ∪ {2¬B};
Qj+1(B) := Sj+1 ∪ {2¬B} ∪ wj
⊡
Qj(B)
.
Note that the preceding definition amounts to the following:
Qj(B) = Sj ∪ {2¬B} ∪ wj−1
⊡
Sj−1∪{2¬B}∪wj−2⊡Sj−2∪{2¬B}∪...···∪w1⊡S1∪{2¬B}
.
6 (W)gen is the following condition: uSwV =⇒ (∃V ′ ⊆ V )uSwV ′ &R[v] ∩ S
−1
w [V ] = ∅.
The requirement we mention is that whenever w ≺S u and we are making an Sw-successor
v of u, that w ≺S∪{2¬B} v for some B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u] where R˙[u] = R[u] ∪ {u}. Since ILP
contains ILW, we already know that ILP is complete w.r.t. the class of generalised ILP-
frames that satisfy (W)gen. We do not, however, know in general if the models obtained by
the standard completeness argument also satisfy this specific requirement (which is, at least
a priori, stronger than (W)gen).
24
Lemma 9.2. Let n ∈ ω\{0} be arbitrary, (wi)i∈{0,...,n} be a finite sequence of
ILP-MCS’s, (Si)i∈{1,...,n} a finite sequence of sets of formulas and B  C a
formula such that:
B  C ∈ wn ≺Sn wn−1 ≺Sn−1 · · · ≺S1 w0 ∋ B.
Then there is an ILP-MCS v such that wn ≺Qn(B) v and C,2¬C ∈ v.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on n. In the base case we are to find v
such that w1 ≺S1∪{2¬B} v. But this is just Lemma 5.8.
Let us prove the claim for n + 1. Fix MCS’s (wi)i∈{0,...,n,n+1}, labels
(Si)i∈{1,...,n,n+1} and a formula B  C. Assume
B  C ∈ wn+1 ≺Sn+1 wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1 w0 ∋ B.
The goal is to find v with wn+1 ≺Qn+1(B) v ∋ C,2¬C, i.e.
wn+1 ≺Sn+1∪{2¬B}∪wn⊡Qn(B)
v ∋ C,2¬C.
From wn+1 ≺ wn and the axiom P we have B  C ∈ wn. By the induction hy-
pothesis, there is v with wn ≺Qn(B) v ∋ C,2¬C. From wn+1 ≺Sn+1 wn ≺Qn(B)
v and the labelling lemma for ILP (Lemma 5.1) we have:
wn+1 ≺Sn+1∪wn⊡Qn(B)
v.
Since {2¬B} ⊆ Qn(B) ⊆ wn⊡Qn(B), we have Sn+1∪wn
⊡
Qn(B)
= Sn+1∪{2¬B}∪
wn
⊡
Qn(B)
. ⊣
Note that the last line shows that a simpler definition of Qj+1(B) would
suffice: Qj+1(B) := Sj+1 ∪ wj⊡Qj(B) instead of Qj+1(B) := Sj+1 ∪ {2¬B} ∪
wj
⊡
Qj(B)
. However, the purpose of this section is to introduce a method for
dealing with arbitrary extensions of ILW. We do not think it is likely that such
a simplification could be made in the case of more interesting logics, such as
ILWR.
In the remainder of this section, D will always be assumed to be a finite set
of formulas closed under taking subformulas and single negations, and ⊤ ∈ D
(i.e. ⊥ → ⊥ ∈ D).
Next we define the structures w.r.t. which we later prove completeness.
When defining Sw we have to take care to make it compatible with the prop-
erties of a generalised Veltman model, in particular, the property that wRu
implies uSw{u} and the property that wRuRv implies uSw{v}. So, if we fix w
and u, we should have uSw{v} for all v ∈ R˙[u](= R[u]∪{u}). However, because
of monotonicity, we want not only uSw{v} in such cases, but also uSwV for all
V ⊆ R[v] that contain v. This is why we add the condition (a) in the definition
below.
Note that in the definition below, worlds are sets of formulas. Because of
this, the operation
⋃
R˙[u] makes sense and defines a set of formulas.
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Definition 9.3. We say that M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) is the ILWP-
structure for a set of formulas D if:
• W = {w : w is an ILP-MCS and for some B ∈ D, B ∧¬B ∈ w};
• wRu⇔ w ≺ u;
• uSwV ⇔ wRu and V ⊆ R[w] and, moreover, one of the following holds:
(a) V ∩ R˙[u] 6= ∅;
(b) we have for all n ∈ ω\{0}, all (wi)i∈{0,...,n}, and all (Si)i∈{1,...,n}:
w = wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1 w0 = u⇒ (∃v ∈ V )(∃B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u]) w ≺Qn(B) v;
• w  p⇔ p ∈ w.
Since from now on all the MCS’s we talk about are elements of some ILWP-
structure, we can somewhat simplify the definition of the assuring successor
(Definition 3.4). In particular, we do not need to find the formula 2C contained
in one MCS but not the other. This was used as a strategy of stopping infinite
ascending R-chains, but here we ensure converse well-foundedness of R already
in the definition of W .
Lemma 9.4. The ILWP-structure M for D is a generalised Veltman model.
Furthermore, the following holds for each w ∈ W and G ∈ D:
M, w  G if and only if G ∈ w,
Proof. Let us first verify that the ILWP-structure M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈
W},) for D is a generalised Veltman model. All the properties, except for
quasi-transitivity, have easy proofs (see [MV20], the proof of Lemma 29).
Let us prove quasi-transitivity. Thus, we assume uSwV , and vSwUv for all
v ∈ V . We put U =
⋃
v∈V Uv and claim that uSwU . Clearly U ⊆ R[w]. To
prove uSwU we will distinguish cases from the definition of the relation Sw for
uSwV.
In Case (a), there exists a MCS v0 ∈ V for some v0 ∈ R˙[u]. We will next
distinguish two Cases from the definition of v0SwUv0 .
In Case (aa) we can find x ∈ Uv0 for some x ∈ R˙[v0]. Since v0 ∈ R˙[u], also
x ∈ R˙[u]. And since x ∈ Uv0 ⊆ U , we have U ∩ R˙[u] 6= ∅. So, we have uSwU as
required.
In Case (ab):
For all n ∈ ω\{0}, all (wi)i∈{0,...,n}, and all (Si)i∈{1,...,n} we have:
w = wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1 w0 = v0 ⇒ (∃x ∈ Uv0)(∃B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[v0]) w ≺Qn(B) x.
To prove uSwU in this case, we will use Case (b) from the definition of the
relation Sw. Let n ∈ ω\{0} be arbitrary and let (wi)i∈{0,...,n} and (Si)i∈{1,...,n}
be arbitrary such that w = wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1 w0 = u. If u = v0, applying
the formula above with the worlds (wi)i∈{0,...,n} and the labels (Si)i∈{1,...,n}
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produces the required x ∈ Uv0 and B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[v0]. Otherwise, i.e. if uRv0,
let w′0 = v0, w
′
i+1 = wi, S
′
1 = ∅, S
′
i+1 = Si and apply the formula above with
n + 1, the sequence (w′i)i∈{0,...,n+1} and the labels (S
′
i)i∈{1,...,n+1}. This gives
us a world x ∈ Uv0 and a formula B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[v0] with:
w ≺Sn∪{2¬B}∪wn−1⊡Sn−1∪...
...w1
⊡
S1∪{2¬B}∪u
⊡
∅∪{2¬B}
x.
Weakening this fact (by removing u⊡∅∪{2¬B}) we have the required property.
Since uRv0 or u = v0, we have R˙[v0] ⊆ R˙[u]. Thus we can reuse B for this Sw
transition.
In Case (b):
For all n ∈ ω\{0}, all (wi)i∈{0,...,n}, and all (Si)i∈{1,...,n} we have:
w = wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1 w0 = u⇒ (∃v ∈ V )(∃B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u]) w ≺Qn(B) v.
To prove uSwU we will use Case (b) from the definition of the relation
Sw. So, let n ∈ ω\{0} be arbitrary and let (wi)i∈{0,...,n} and (Si)i∈{1,...,n} be
arbitrary such that w = wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1 w0 = u.
By the assumption of this case, there are v0 ∈ V and B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u] such
that w ≺Qn(B) v0. From v0 ∈ V we have v0SwUv0 . We will next distinguish the
possible cases in the definition for v0SwUv0 .
In the first Case (ba) we have Uv0 ∩ R˙[v0] 6= ∅, i.e. there is x ∈ Uv0 such that
either v0 = x or v0Rx. In both cases we have w ≺Qn(B) x.
In Case (bb), we have (Case (b) for v0SwUv0 applied to n = 1 and S1 =
Qn(B)) that there are some x ∈ Uv0 andB
′ ∈ D∩
⋃
R˙[v0] such that w ≺Qn(B)∪{¬B′}
x. By weakening, w ≺Qn(B) x, as required.
We claim that for each formula G ∈ D and each world w ∈ W the following
holds:
M, w  G if and only if G ∈ w.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of G. The only non-trivial case is
when G = B  C.
Assume B  C ∈ w, wRu and u  B. Induction hypothesis implies B ∈ u.
We claim that uSw[C]w by Case (b) from the definition of Sw. Clearly wRu
and [C]w ⊆ R[w].
Fix n ∈ ω\{0}, (wi)i∈{0,...,n} and (Si)i∈{1,...,n}. Assume w = wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1
w0 = u. Since B  C ∈ w0 and B ∈ w0, Lemma 9.4 implies that there is an
ILP-MCS v with w0 ≺Qn(B) v and C,2¬C ∈ v (thus v ∈ W ). Since C ∈ v,
the induction hypothesis implies v  C. Since w ≺ v, i.e. wRv, then v ∈ [C]w.
Finally, B ∈ D and B ∈ u imply B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u].
To prove the converse, assume B  C /∈ w. Since w is an ILP-MCS, ¬(B 
C) ∈ w. Lemma 5.7 implies there is u with w ≺{¬B,¬C} u and B ∈ u. Since
w ≺{¬B} u, we have in particular that ¬B ∈ u. So, u ∈ W. The induction
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hypothesis implies u  B. Let V ⊆ R[w] be such that uSwV . We will find
a world v ∈ V such that w ≺{¬C} v. We will distinguish Cases (a) and (b)
from the definition of the relation Sw. Consider Case (a). Let v be an arbitrary
world in V ∩ R˙[u]. If v = u, clearly w ≺{¬B,¬C} v. If uRv, then we have
w ≺{¬B,¬C} u ≺ v. This implies w ≺{¬B,¬C} v. Consider Case (b). From
w ≺{¬B,¬C} u and the definition of Sw it follows that there is v ∈ V such that
(for some formula D) w ≺{¬B,¬C,¬D} v. In both cases we have w ≺{¬C} v;
thus C /∈ v. Induction hypothesis implies v 1 C; whence V 1 C, as required. ⊣
Theorem 9.5. ILP is complete w.r.t. the class of all generalised Veltman
frames satisfying (P)gen. In particular, ILP is complete w.r.t. the class of
ILWP-structures generated by all appropriate sets D.
Proof. In the light of Lemma 9.4, it suffices to show that the ILWP-structure
M for D possesses the property (P)gen.7
Let us prove (P)gen. Let wRw
′RuSwV and take V
′ = V ∩ R[w′]. We claim
uSw′V
′.
We distinguish two possible cases for uSwV . If it holds by Case (a), there is
v ∈ V such that either u = v or uRv. In both cases w′Rv. Let U = {v}. Clearly
U ⊆ V . Since w′RuRv, uSw′{v}, i.e. uSw′U . The remainder of the proof deals
with the case when uSwV holds by Case (b) from the definition of Sw.
Fix n ∈ ω\{0}, the worlds (wi)i∈{0,...,n} and the labels (Si)i∈{1,...,n}. Assume
w′ = wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1 w0 = u. We have w ≺∅ wn ≺Sn · · · ≺S1 w0. Now the
definition of uSwV implies there is v ∈ V with:
w ≺∅∪{2¬B}∪wn⊡Qn(B)
v.
We claim that wn ≺Qn(B) v. Assume A
∨
¬Fi ∈ wn with Fi ∈ Qn(B) (we are
to show that ¬A,2¬A ∈ v). Clearly ¬A,2¬A ∈ wn⊡Qn(B). Since a ≺S b implies
S ⊆ b, we have ¬A,2¬A ∈ v. ⊣
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